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Abstract 
The main objective was to investigate whether constituents’ emotions would have an 
effect on the bargaining behavior of group representatives. In a computer-mediated 
negotiation task of six rounds, participants, as group representatives, were led to believe 
that four constituents were involved. Participants received information about the 
emotional state of their constituents and whether they would stay in contact in the future. 
One hundred undergraduate students participated in this study. All offers and concessions 
made by participants were transformed into an index indicating the level of demand as 
the dependent measure. Results show that constituents’ emotions did not have a 
significant effect on the bargaining behavior of group representatives. However, an 
increasing effect per round was found, indicating a positive trend. Furthermore, from 
round five onwards a significant effect of future interaction on the bargaining behavior 
was found. In conclusion, results indicate that constituents’ emotions might have an 
effect on bargaining behavior of group representatives if negotiation time is extended. 
Keywords: Emotions, Constituents, Negotiation, Group representatives. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Could you imagine, walking on the Piazza Navona in Rome. When looking around you 
see street artists on every corner ripping off tourists. They are not able to negotiate 
successfully because they want to have that particularly piece of art so badly. I was in this 
situation a couple of years ago. My boyfriend and I wanted to have the perfect souvenir 
and on our last evening we found it. I couldn’t be more happy. I knew my negotiation 
skills would not be that convincing, so my boyfriend did the job on our behalf. 
Unfortunately, he was so affected by my happiness of founding the perfect piece that he 
only set a low demand and made larger concessions towards the street artist. My 
boyfriend didn’t see the necessity to negotiate because he knew that I would be happy 
with every price, as long as I got the souvenir. After all these years, I am still sure we got 
ripped off and the street artist is probably still laughing. ((Sounds this familiar? An 
emotion from your constituency affecting the negotiation)). If this sounds familiar, you 
probably had emotions from your constituency affecting the outcome of a negotiation. 
 As the above anecdote shows, my happiness had a major effect on the negotiation 
strategy of my boyfriend and the possible outcome. 
Even though negotiation has been a topic of research for a long time, the role of 
emotions in negotiations has only been addressed since a decade. Van Kleef, De Dreu 
and Manstead (2004) started this line of research by investigating the effects of two 
emotions (anger and happiness) on two bargainers. However, it seems that there is still a 
lot to learn about the emotional influence between a negotiator and the constituency. 
Therefore, this thesis addresses the issue of the effect of emotions displayed by 
constituency members on the bargaining behavior of group representatives. Having more 
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insight in interpersonal effects between a negotiator and his constituency will not only be 
interesting from a theoretical perspective, but also could be of interest for the working 
field. Since many negotiations take place on behalf of an organization and/or in the 
presence of team members a deeper insight in the effects of emotions displayed by others 
(e.g., colleagues) on a negotiator could be beneficial. 
 Before continuing with the research question of this thesis, a deeper insight in the 
literature on intergroup negotiation and the literature on emotions in negotiation will be 
given in the next chapters.  
Constituents   
 
In many group negotiations, there is a negotiator, who negotiates on behalf of his group. 
In such a negotiation, the representative is more or less bound by implicit and explicit 
directions provided by his constituents, and faces accountability pressures (De Dreu, 
Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007, as cited in Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & 
Ramírez-Marín, 2009). A representative not only should consider the needs, desires, 
preferences, strategic intentions and tactical maneuvers of his counterpart, but also should 
take into account preferences, ideas, and suggestions of his constituency (Jones & 
Worchel, 1992). Therefore, representatives should monitor their constituency and adapt 
their goals and behavior accordingly.  
In previous research, it was found that group representatives are motivated to 
make a good impression on their constituents and try hard to satisfy the demands of the 
constituents (as cited in Steinel et al., 2009). So, group norms seem to have an impact on 
group representatives during negotiations.  
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Effect of Emotions on Negotiations 
 
In early negotiation literature, a negotiation is defined as a discussion between two or 
more parties aimed at resolving a perceived divergence of interest (Pruitt & Carnevale 
1993, as cited in Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2004). A few years later Davidson and 
Greenhalgh (1999, as cited in Van Kleef et al., 2004) stated that ‘if two parties have a 
difference in opinion but neither show an emotional reaction, there will be no negotiation. 
Emotions in negotiations are, therefore, always present and have their influences on 
negotiations. Emotions are a way of communicating towards oneself and others (Schwarz 
& Clore, 1983). Besides, emotions give information about how someone feels, someone’s 
social intentions and about someone’s orientation toward other people Finally, emotions 
only arise if an event is appraised as relevant to some concern (Ekman, 1993). This 
means that these emotions can provide important information. When looking at the 
context of a negotiation, emotions signal what value one attaches to the different issues 
and provide critical feedback about one’s mood and willingness to agree (Putnam, 1994, 
as cited in Van Kleef et al., 2004). This means that a representative not only can get 
important information from his opponent about his motives, but that his constituency can 
signal their values and opinions through their emotions as well.   
Furthermore, a distinction can be made between intrapersonal effects and 
interpersonal effects. The former refers to the influence of an individual’s emotions on 
his own behavior (Morris & Keltner, 2000), whereas the latter refers to the influence of 
one negotiator’s emotions on the other negotiator’s behavior (Van Kleef et al., 2004). In 
the last twenty years, multiple researchers have emphasized the importance of the 
interpersonal functions of emotions in negotiations. In order to integrate previous 
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findings and resolve inconsistencies Van Kleef (2008) introduced the Emotions as Social 
Information (EASI) model, which was developed to account for the interpersonal effects 
of emotions in social and organizational life. The idea that emotions provide information 
is one of the core foundations of the EASI model. The purpose of the EASI model is to 
predict how one person’s emotional expressions affect other people’s behavior (Van 
Kleef, 2008). Therefore, this model can explain how negotiators are affected by their 
counterparts’ emotions. However, it is most likely that group representatives, therefore, 
are affected by the emotions of their constituency in the same manner. Thus, emotional 
expressions provide information to observers, which may influence their behavior. This 
notion is extended by the EASI model by identifying two processes through which 
observers’ behavior may be influenced: inferential processes and affective reactions (Van 
Kleef, 2009). The first process posits that each emotion conveys unique information, 
which observers may use to draw strategic inferences to determine their own behavior 
(Van Kleef, 2008). The second process posits that emotional expressions can also wield 
interpersonal influence by eliciting affective reactions in observers, which may 
subsequently affect their behavior (Van Kleef, 2009). These affective reactions consist of 
two types: through emotional-contagion processes and through social intentions and 
relational orientations (Van Kleef, 2009). Especially, the emotional-contagion type is 
interesting. In a previous study, it was found that emotion displays tend to evoke 
complementary or reciprocal emotions in others that help individuals to respond to 
significant social events (Keltner & Haidt, 1999).  
Van Kleef et al. (2004) elaborated upon the foregoing ideas. They tested the 
social contagion hypothesis and the strategic-choice hypothesis (mismatching). The 
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social contagion hypothesis was based on the study of Levy and Nail (1993). Levy and 
Nail (1993) defined social contagion as ‘the spread of affect, attitude, or behavior, from 
Person A (the initiator) to Person B (the recipient) where the recipient does not perceive 
an intentional influence attempt on the part of the initiator. So, for instance, if the initiator 
shows anger, the recipient will become angry himself. Former research suggested that 
social contagion not only occurs in face-to-face settings, but also in computer-mediated 
interactions (De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans & Van de Vliert, 1994). The strategic-choice 
hypothesis posits that negotiators mismatch the opponent’s emotions. It occurs when 
individuals lack information about the opponent’s outcomes and limits.  
Based on these theories, it can be said that emotional expressions convey crucial 
information about feelings and intentions of the sender, and this in return has behavioral 
consequences for receivers.  
In the present study, three emotions will be at display: Anger, Happiness and 
Disappointment. According to Van Kleef et al. (2009), these emotions are potentially 
relevant to most, if not all, negotiations. Especially happiness and anger are most likely to 
arise in the context of leader-follower interactions and (un)satisfactory team performance. 
Furthermore, these emotions are basic emotions and, therefore, universally recognized 
among different cultures (Ekman, 1993). This means, that possible outcomes of this study 
enhance the generalizability of any findings. 
Anger and happiness. In the context of negotiation, the majority of studies have 
focused on the effects of anger and happiness. Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) found that 
participants conceded more to angry counterparts compared to non-emotional 
counterparts. Angry opponents appear to be tougher and, therefore, were able to elicit 
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larger concessions than happy counterparts. Research from Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni 
and Manstead (2006) showed that low-power negotiators conceded more to an angry 
counterpart than to a happy one, whereas high-power negotiators were unaffected by the 
other’s emotion. Van Kleef et al. (2004) showed that negotiators made large concessions 
if their opponent showed anger due to the strategic-choice perspective. 
In the above studies, it was found that due to an angry opponent the negotiator 
would make low demands and large concessions. Moreover, if the negotiator dealt with a 
happy opponent he would make higher demands and smaller concessions.  Focusing on a 
situation where a negotiator is bargaining in name of an angry constituency, in line with 
the social contagion perspective, and therefore in line with the affective reaction path in 
the EASI model, the group representative can be expected to be more competitive 
towards the opponent if the constituency sends an angry message. This could result in 
higher demands and lower concessions made by the group representative (Hypothesis 
1A). Consequently, in line with the social contagion perspective, the opposite would 
apply for a happy constituency. If the constituency sends a happy message, it is expected 
that the group representative will be more cooperative towards the opponent. This could 
result in lower demands and higher concessions made by the group representative 
(Hypothesis 1B).   
Disappointment. Previous research showed that disappointment arises when 
progress toward a goal is below expectations and/or when a desired outcome is not 
achieved (as cited in Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2013). Research on 
social functions of disappointment has found that negotiators with disappointed 
opponents tend to infer that the other has received too little (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 
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2008) and was hoping for more (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995). Moreover, an 
association between disappointment and guilt has been established in previous research. 
Ferguson, Olthof and Stegge (1997) demonstrated that victim’s anticipated 
disappointment was highly correlated with the participants’ feeling of guilt. Furthermore, 
guilt stimulates concessions in a negotiation setting (Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, 
Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2011). They suggested that expressions of disappointment could 
elicit generous offers by evoking guilt in others in a negotiation setting.   
Lelieveld et al. (2013) suggest that when individuals bargain with outgroup 
members, they may be less concerned with their opponent’s outcomes and experience 
lower levels of guilt. Thus, opponent’s group membership may be a crucial determinant 
of whether disappointment evokes guilt or not.  
When looking into representative negotiation a bargainer’s constituency does 
have a significant impact on bargaining behavior. Negotiators who negotiate on behalf of 
others have a desire to make a positive impression on their constituents (as cited in 
Lelieveld et al., 2013). Representatives will adopt a more competitive bargaining strategy 
and make smaller concessions (Van Kleef, Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 
2007). Lelieveld et al. (2013) found that feelings of guilt were evoked indeed, resulting 
from ingroup members communicating disappointment. In line with these findings, it can 
be expected that feelings of guilt in the group representative will be evoked by 
constituents expressing disappointment. Therefore, if the constituency sends a 
disappointed message, the group representative will make higher demands and lower 
concessions (Hypothesis 1C).  
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Future Interaction  
Van Kleef et al. (2004) found that the effect of the opponent’s emotion only occurs when 
it is in the negotiator’s strategic interest to act on the other’s emotion. If there is no need 
to take the other’s emotion into consideration, the emotion effect was absent. This can be 
translated into a distinction between a future and a no-future interaction. A representative 
could adapt his bargaining behavior in response to the emotions that the constituency is 
sending. According to the research of Van Kleef et al. (2004), it should be in the group 
representative best interest to listen to the emotion of the constituency when the 
representative has planned a future interaction with the constituency. This should mean 
that the group representative will make higher demands and lower concessions in case of 
a future interaction than when no future interaction is expected (Hypothesis 2). In case 
there is no future interaction expected, there would be no strategic advantage for the 
group representative to follow the emotion of his constituency. He simply will not care 
about what his constituency think of his bargaining strategy.  
In conclusion, based on existing intergroup literature and emotions in negotiation 
literature, it can be expected that emotions of constituents do have an effect on group 
representatives. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This thesis will focus on the following research question: What is the effect of emotions 
displayed by constituency members on the bargaining behavior of group representatives?  
The following hypotheses will be tested: 
Hypothesis 1A: If the constituency sends an angry message, the group representative will 
make higher demands and lower concessions. 
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Hypothesis 1B: If the constituency sends a happy message, the group representative will 
make lower demands and higher concessions. 
Hypothesis 1C: If the constituency sends a disappointed message, the group 
representative will make higher demands and lower concessions. 
Hypothesis 2: If there is a future interaction expected, the group representative will make 
higher demands and lower concessions than when no future interaction is expected  
Method 
 
Participants and Experimental Design   
A total of 100 Leiden University undergraduate students (70 female, 28 male; mean age = 
22.18, SD = 6.64) participated in exchange for €5 or 2 Credits.  There were no specific 
criteria for participants to participate in this study. Participants were recruited through 
social media, on campus and through an electronic system for research participation 
(Sona). Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. The 3 X 2 
design included the constituency’s emotion (happiness vs. anger vs. disappointment) and 
the expectation of future interaction (yes vs. no) as a between-participants variable and 
the total level of demand for each negotiation round as the dependent variable. 
Procedure 
On arrival at the laboratory of the Faculty of Social Sciences in Leiden, participants were 
welcomed to the experiment and were seated in separate cubicles in front of a computer. 
The experimenter started the computer program. All instructions, including the informed 
consent, were presented on the computer screen. Participants read that the purpose of this 
experiment was to negotiate with a bar owner, on behalf of their sports team, to organize 
a party in a bar. Two manipulations were built in. All offers during negotiations were 
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recorded and transformed into an index as dependent measure. Participants completed a 
post-negotiation questionnaire that assessed the adequacy of the experimental 
manipulations. The experiment took about 25 minutes. After finishing the task, 
participants were thanked and received a small amount of money or credits.  
Negotiation Task 
The negotiation task was an adapted version of the one used by Van Kleef et al. (2004), 
which captured the main characteristics of a real-life negotiation (i.e., multiple issues, 
which differ in usefulness to the negotiator, information about one’s own payoffs only, 
and typical offer-counteroffer sequence).  
Participants were led to believe that they would engage in a computer-mediated 
negotiation with four other participants, who would be the constituents, and the 
negotiation party (all of this behavior was in fact simulated by the computer). In the 
current research, participants learned that they would be assigned to the role of either 
‘pub owner’, ‘treasurer’ of his/her own sports team or ‘team member’. The objective of 
their negotiation was to negotiate about the closing time of the pub, minimum quota of 
the bar and guarantee. After a short pause, during which the computer supposedly 
assigned the different roles to the participants, all participants were assigned to the role of 
treasurer. Then, a payoff chart was presented to participants (see Table 1) that showed 
them which outcomes were most favorable to them and they were told that their objective 
was to earn as many points as possible. As can be seen in Table 1, Level 9 on closing 
time (00:00h) yielded 0 points and Level 1 (04:00h) yielded 400 points (i.e., increments 
of 50 points per level). For minimum quota of the bar, Level 9 (€3000) yielded 0 points, 
and Level 1 (€1000) yielded 120 points (i.e., 15-point increments). Finally, for guarantee, 
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Level 9 (€1000) yielded 0 points, and Level 1 (€200) yielded 240 points (i.e., 30 points 
increments). 
Table 1 
Participants’ payoff chart 
 
After these instructions, the negotiation started and the pub owner (i.e., the 
computer) made the first offer. Over the negotiation rounds the pub owner proposed the 
following levels of agreement (for closing time – minimum bar – guarantee): 8-7-8 
(Round 1), 8-7-7 (Round 2), 8-6-7 (Round 3), 7-6-7 (Round 4), 7-6-6 (Round 5), 6-6-6 
(Round 6). Past research has shown that this preprogrammed strategy has face validity 
and that it is seen as intermediate in cooperativeness and competitiveness (De Dreu & 
Van Lange, 1995 as cited in Van Kleef et al., 2004). A demand from participants was 
accepted if it equaled the offer that the computer was about to make in the next round. If 
no agreement was reached after Round 6 the negotiation was interrupted by asking 
several questions to the participant.  
Manipulations during the Negotiation Task 
Manipulation of constituent’s emotions. After the 1st, 3rd and 5th offer was sent, 
participants received information about the ‘opinions of the constituency’, which 
contained the manipulation of the constituency’s emotions. Participants had to wait for 
 Closing time bar Minimum quota bar Guarantee  
Level Time (h) Payoff Minimum Rev. Payoff Deposit Payoff 
1 04:00 400 €1000 120 €200 240 
2 03:30 350 €1250 105 €300 210 
3 03:00 300 €1500 90 €400 180 
4 02:30 250 €1750 75 €500 150 
5 02:00 200 €2000 60 €600 120 
6 01:30 150 €2250 45 €700 90 
7 01:00 100 €2500 30 €800 60 
8 00:30 50 €2750 15 €900 30 
9 00:00 0 €3000 0 €1000 0 
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about 13 seconds while the team members were ‘typing’ their opinions. After this short 
wait, participants could click to the next page to read the emotional statements of the 
constituency. Participants were randomized classified in one of the three emotional 
conditions (anger, happiness or disappointment). It was stressed that the pub owner could 
not read these emotional statements. For instance, after the first round in the angry 
condition, team members sent out the following emotional reactions: ‘Ik baal van je bod, 
ik ben er behoorlijk geïrriteerd door’ [I am fed up with your offer, it really irritates me], 
‘Het idee alleen al dat je dit bod hebt voorgelegd, maakt mij nog al boos!’ [Only the idea 
that you have made this offer in the first place, makes me angry], Ik ben echt enorm 
gefrustreerd door dit bod! [I am very frustrated by this offer]’. In Appendix A, all 
feedback of the constituency per condition per emotion can be found. In earlier research, 
a pretest was carried out whether participants understood which sentence matched the 
emotions ‘Anger’, ‘Happiness’, and ‘Disappointment’ respectively (Van der Veken, 
2016). 
Manipulation of Future Interaction. In the second manipulation, participants 
were randomly assigned between the script with a future interaction or no-future 
interaction. In the script with a future interaction, participants learned that they had to 
organize a party, because they were celebrating the end of the season. They learned that 
next year they would continue playing for their team, i.e., the same team. In the script 
with no future interaction, participants learned that their team had to split up and that they 
would never see their team members ever again. They had to organize a farewell party. 
To make sure that participants would understand in which condition they were in, they 
were led to believe that at the end of the negotiation a creative task had to be carried out. 
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Participants in the future interaction were led to believe that they had to come up with 
slogans for their party together with their team members. Participants in the no-future 
interaction were led to believe that they had to come up with slogans for their fare well 
party by themselves. In fact, participants did not get this creative task.  
Dependent Measure  
The offers made by participants in each round were recorded and transformed into an 
index, which revealed the participant’s total level of demand for each negotiation and 
their total level of demand (i.e., the number of points demanded in that round, summed 
across the three negotiation issues of closing time – minimum bar – guarantee; see Table 
1). Finally, their concessions were recoded and transformed into an index as well (i.e., the 
total number of points demanded in level 6 minus the total number of points demand in 
level 2).  
After the negotiation, participants completed a post-negotiation questionnaire that 
assessed the adequacy of the experimental manipulations. Questions were asked to check 
whether participants had understood whether they were in the future or no-future 
interaction conditions and whether they had understood which emotion their team 
members sent towards them. These questions were scored with a 5-point scale, with 1 = 
‘totally not’ to 5 = ‘to a very high degree’.  
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Results 
Manipulation Checks 
First, the manipulation of constituent’s emotions was checked. If this manipulation would 
be successful there should be a difference between each of the three emotion conditions 
(anger vs. happy vs. disappointment). Besides, the ratings within each condition should 
be higher for the corresponding emotion than for the other emotions. This was tested with 
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). A MANOVA was performed on the 
perceived happiness, perceived anger and perceived disappointment scores with emotion 
as a between-groups factor. Results showed that indeed participants had understood the 
intended emotion sent by their constituents (F (6, 186) = 74.92, p < .001). To specify this 
result further, a Post hoc Tukey HSD was performed. This test showed (see Table 2) that 
participants in the happy emotion condition indeed perceived more happiness than in the 
anger and disappointment emotion condition (M = 4.56, SD = .78 vs. M = 1.09, SD = .24 
vs. M = 1.21, SD = .66). This is the same for participants in the anger emotion condition, 
where they indeed perceived more anger than disappointment and happiness (M = 4.44, 
SD = 1.10 vs. M = 3.70, SD = 1.29 vs. M = 1.03, SD = .17). However, results show that 
participants in the disappointment emotion condition did not distinguish between the 
anger and disappointment emotion condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.10 vs. M = 3.97, SD = 
1.40). 
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Table 2 
Participant’s perception of constituent’s emotion 
 
Actual sent Emotions 
Perceived Constituent’s 
Emotions 
Anger Happiness Disappointment 
Anger 4.44 1.09 4.00 
Happiness 1.03 4.56 1.12 
Disappointment 3.70 1.21 3.97 
 
Second, the manipulation of future interaction was tested with a MANOVA as 
well. It was tested whether participants had understood in which condition they were held 
in. This MANOVA was performed on perceived future and perceived no future 
interaction scores with future interactions as a between-groups factor. Results show that 
participants indeed made a difference between a future and a no-future interaction 
condition (F (2, 95) = 11.28, p < .001, r = .036, M = 3.68, SD = 1.12 vs.  M = 2.83, SD = 
.95).  
Demands 
To be able to answer the main research question on the effect of emotions displayed by 
constituents on the bargaining behavior of group representatives, a 3 (emotion: anger vs. 
happiness vs. disappointment) x 2 (future interaction: yes vs. no) ANOVA on 
concessions made showed no main effects (F (2, 92) = 1.37, p = .260 and F (1, 92) = 
1.17, p = .263). Participants did not differ in the concessions (demand level) they made in 
neither the emotion condition nor in the future versus no-future interaction condition. 
Besides, no interaction effect was found (F (2, 92) = 1.07, p = .188). In light of the above 
results, none of the hypotheses could be confirmed.  
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Next, separate ANOVAs were conducted to compare the effect of emotion and 
future interaction on the total amount of points for each round separately, again starting 
with Round 2. 
Results (see Appendix B) show a significant effect of future interaction vs. no-future 
interaction from Round 5 and 6, respectively (F (1, 92) = 4.44, p = .038, M = 512.05, SD 
= 119.17 and F (1, 92) = 4.81, p = .031, M = 511.68, SD = 117.90). However, in none of 
the circumstances an interaction effect between emotions and future interaction was 
found. So, when looking at every round separately, it is found that after several rounds 
there is an effect on the concessions made depending on whether a group representative 
will stay in contact with their constituency in the future or not. Although differences 
between future and no-future interaction condition become significant not before Round 
5, ƞ² starts increasing in Round 3 (see Appendix B) indicating an increasing effect of 
future vs. no-future interaction on bargaining behavior. 
The same applies for Emotion (see Appendix B). Although no significance was found, 
the increasing ƞ² indicates a positive trend towards significance. 
Discussion 
The main research question and objective of this study was to establish whether there is 
an effect of emotions displayed by constituency members on the bargaining behavior of 
group representatives. It was expected that emotions displayed by constituents would 
affect the bargaining behavior of group representatives. However, results show that the 
predictions made could not be confirmed. This means that the emotional feedback given 
by the constituency did not have an effect on the demands and concessions made by the 
group representative. As far as we know, the current design has not been used before. So, 
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results cannot be related to results of comparable previous studies. In order to ground the 
current study in related theories, the predictions made in this thesis for a happy and angry 
constituency were mainly based on the Emotions as Social Information model (EASI) by 
Van Kleef (2008). He focused on the effect of one negotiator’s emotions on the other 
negotiator’s behavior. It was expected that the core foundations of the EASI model (Van 
Kleef, 2008) could also apply to a group representative – constituency relationship 
instead of just a one bargainer – opponent relationship. However, results are not in line 
with the EASI model. Results of the present study were not in line with the research of 
Lelieveld et al. (2013) either. Lelieveld et al. (2013) found that ingroup members 
communicating disappointment evoked feelings of guilt. However, this effect was not 
found in the current research and therefore, one person’s disappointed emotional 
expression did not affect the bargaining behavior of group representatives. This means 
that one person’s emotional expression did not affect other people’s behavior in a group 
representative – constituency relationship (Hypotheses 1A, 1B,1C). It should be 
acknowledged, however, that participants perceived the ‘disappointment’ condition as 
less authentic relative to the ‘anger’ and ‘happy’ conditions. 
Another issue addressed in this thesis concerned the question whether future 
interaction has an effect on group representatives in relation to the emotional feedback 
given by the constituency. It was expected that emotions displayed by constituents in a 
future interaction scenario had more effect on the bargaining behavior of group 
representatives than when there was no future interaction expected (Hypotheses 2). 
However, results show that the emotional feedback given by the constituency and future 
interaction or not did not affect one another. Therefore, the predication made could not be 
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confirmed. This predication was based on earlier studies of Van Kleef et al. (2004) They 
showed that if it is in the negotiator’s best interest to act on the other’s emotion, the 
opponent’s emotions has an effect. The results of the current research are not in line with 
these findings. Group representatives did not make any changes in their bargaining 
behavior even when his/her constituency sent an angry or disappointed message and had 
to face them again.  
Although in the overall results no significant effects were found, several findings 
draw the attention. Looking closer into the separate rounds of negotiations, it appears that 
there is a time effect. When looking at the main effect of future interaction it was found 
that the last two rounds of negotiation the effect of future interaction became significant. 
This indicates that group representatives started to act upon the feedback they were given 
by constituents. The question arises what the cause could be of this effect? Since no 
interaction effect was found, it seems that emotional feedback is not the main reason to 
act in the best interest of the constituency if future interaction is expected. Furthermore, it 
seems that the more rounds the group representative negotiated and the more feedback 
(s)he got, the more the results moved towards significance as well. Therefore, results 
show a positive trend. This could indicate that if the negotiation rounds were extended 
over time that an effect of emotions of constituents on the bargaining behavior of group 
representatives would be found.  
Limitations 
There are some limitations to the present findings that should be acknowledged. First of 
all, quite a homogenous group of participants was used. Most participants were 
Psychology students from the same university within the same age group, who are 
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familiar with acting as participants. Female students were in the majority. So, there are 
limitations to the generalizability of the findings. Furthermore, the decision was made to 
make use of a computer-mediated experiment instead of a face-to-face interaction. Due to 
using a computer-mediated negotiation, it was possible to maintain experimental control. 
Especially, it enabled the experimenter to carefully control the manipulation of the 
constituents’ emotions. However, the drawback of this kind of experiment was that not 
all participants believed the manipulations in this experiment to be real. Some 
participants gave feedback afterwards, telling that they knew the feedback given by the 
constituency was actually a pre-programmed computer program. This could mean that 
participants simply did not care what ‘the computer said’ and followed their own 
negotiation path and did not attach any value to the emotions of their constituency.   
Another issue is the possibility of power differences. In this experiment, all 
participants were appointed the role of treasurer of their sports team. Earlier research of 
Fiske (1993) showed that the motivation to consider information about other people is 
reduced by power. De Dreu and Van Kleef (2004) showed that high-power negotiators 
were unaffected by other’s emotions, which could be an explanation for the results of this 
research. Participants, when giving their feedback, suggested that other team members 
should be pleased the negotiation even took place, without complaining about the 
negotiation strategy. This indicates that participants felt they had a higher power level 
than their team members and, therefore, were unaffected by the emotions the 
constituency sent out.  
Moreover, participants did not form a group in real life. Therefore, group representatives 
might not feel the need to make a good impression on their constituents. 
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Future Research 
In order to increase both the criterion and the external validity of the experiment,  
a multi-method design is suggested for future research. Therefore, it is suggested to 
conduct future research not only in a computer-mediated experiment, but also in a face-
to-face experiment. This means that a new study would be carried out outside a 
laboratory, in a more realistic setting where participants negotiate with actors who are 
trained to provoke certain emotions. At the same time, trained observers should score the 
demands and concessions of the participants with standardized forms. Next, results from 
such an experiment can be compared with results from computer-based experiments. This 
way, it can be checked whether participants in general do not care about emotions of 
constituents or that the presence and emotions of ‘real’ constituents does have an effect 
on the bargaining behavior of group representatives. Furthermore, to take it one step 
further, participants could be placed in a FMRI-scan performing negotiation tasks as in 
this experiment. It would be interesting to see if and to what extent emotional feedback of 
the constituency would activate certain brain areas of group representatives.   
Another suggestion for future research has to do with the time effect found in this study. 
Looking at the results, it appears that after every negotiation round and, therefore the 
more feedback the group representative got, results increased towards significance. In 
future research, it should be tested whether there is a stable influence from the variable 
‘time’. Based on the present results, it can be expected that by extending negotiation 
rounds and feedback moments over time, significant effects of constituents’ emotions on 
bargaining behavior of group representatives will be found. In that case the more time a 
group representative spends with the constituency, the more influence the constituency 
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will have. Lots of organizations work with project teams that work together for a certain 
amount of time. If time would have an effect on the influence of emotions displayed by 
constituents, managers and team members should be aware of this.  
In conclusion, although the formulated hypotheses could not be confirmed yet, an 
interesting time-effect on the effect of constituents’ emotions on the bargaining behavior 
of group representatives was found. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to elaborate 
further upon this line of research in a way as suggested in a few directions for future 
research. Results might indicate that the constituency-group representative design has its 
own dynamics that cannot be derived directly from a one-to-one bargaining setting. 
Maybe, the suggested designs will yield insights and/or results that could be relevant for 
both the scientific and the working field. 
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Appendix A –  Emotional Feedback Expressed by the Constituency 
 
Ronde 1 Boos Teleurgesteld Blij 
Feedback 1 Ik baal van je bod, ik ben 
er behoorlijk geïrriteerd 
door.  
Jeetje, wat jammer dat je 
dit biedt.. 
Lekker beeeeeeeeezig! 
Feedback 2 Het idee alleen al dat je dit 
bod hebt voorgelegd, 
maakt me nogal boos!  
Ik vind het een nogal 
teleurstellend bod.  
Ik sluit me volledig aan bij 
je bod!  
Feedback 3 Ik ben echt enorm 
gefrustreerd door dit bod! 
Ik vind dit bod nogal 
tegenvallen.  
Goed bod! Ik ben blij dat jij 
ons vertegenwoordigt. 
Ronde 2     
Feedback 1 Pfff…. dit bod maakt me 
boos!! 
Ik had het graag anders 
gezien, want dit bod stelt 
me teleur… 
Top! Ik zeg doen.  
Feedback 2 Dit bod maakt me erg 
pissig.  
Ik vind het een nogal 
teleurstellend bod.  
Goed bezig! Ga zo door!  
Feedback 3 Hoe haal je het in je hoofd 
dit te bieden?! 
Ik vind jouw bod een 
afknapper.. 
 
Prima! Dit bod maakt me 
helemaal blij hoor!  
Ronde 3    
Feedback 1  Ik word echt heel nijdig 
van dit bod! 
Ik vind het echt een 
deceptie, dat je dit bod hebt 
gegeven 
Wow! Een beter bod had  ik 
zelf niet kunnen uitbrengen! 
Helemaal top dus 
Feedback 2 Ik begin mij echt te ergeren 
aan het bod wat je nu 
uitbrengt 
Dat bod is wel een beetje 
een flop helaas 
Laat dat feest maar 
beginnen! Goed bezig 
Feedback 3 Ik begin echt kwaad te 
worden 
Wat een domper, had toch 
graag een ander bod 
voorbij zien komen 
Ik te springen, dit is een 
eitje! Ga zo door  
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Appendix B –  Results per Round 
 
 DF F  p ŋ² 
Round 2     
Emotion 2 .25 .776 .005 
Future 1 2.01 .160 .021 
Error 92    
Round 3     
Emotion 2 .16 .849 .004 
Future 1 1.53 .220 .016 
Error 92    
Round 4     
Emotion 2 .82 .446 .017 
Future 1 3.35 .070 .035 
Error 92    
Round 5     
Emotion 2 2.06 .134 .043 
Future 1 4.44 .038* .046 
Error 92    
Round 6     
Emotion 2 2.80 .066 .057 
Future 1 4.81 .031* .050 
Error 92    
*Significant at a level of p ≤ .05.  
 
